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Free trade agreements lead to a rise in bilateral trade 
regardless of whether the signatories are developed or 
developing countries. Furthermore, the percentage 
increase in bilateral trade is higher for South-South 
agreements than for North-South agreements. In this 
paper, the results are robust across a number of  gravity 
model specifications in which the analysis controls for the 
endogeneity of free trade agreements (with bilateral fixed 
effects) and also takes account of multilateral resistance 
in both estimation (with country-time fixed effects) and 
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1.  Introduction 
Trade  liberalization  can  play  an  important  role  in  integrating  developing  countries  into  the  global 
market. Trade agreements via customs unions or free trade agreements (FTAs) have become the most 
popular form to achieve it. According to the World Trade Organization,
1 283 trade agreements were in 
force on 31 July 2010, but if we add those being proposed and negotiated, there will be 474. Over 90% 
of them take the form of FTAs and partial scope agreements, while customs unions account for 10%.
2  
Although  regional  agreem ents  predominate,  new  agreements  increasingly  engage  developed  and 
developing countries from different geographical regions.  As a result, a lively debate on the relative 
merits of arrangements involving developing countries has arisen. Issues such as whet her developing 
countries are likely to be better served, in terms of increased trade volumes, by agreements among 
themselves or by agreements with Northern partners are at the center stage.
3    
The gravity equation has been the traditional model to investigate the effects of trade agreements on 
bilateral trade flows. Earlier results have been mixed and controversial (Abrams, 1980; Frankel et al, 
1995), but recent studies find evidence that trade agreements do increase countries’ bilateral trade 
flows significantly (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).   
Even so, it is not clear that this effect applies systematically to developing countries and whether this 
holds for agreements with developed and other developing countries alike. On the one hand, developing 
countries can be unnatural trading partners due to similarities in endowments, smaller economic size 
and higher trade costs (Krugman, 1991; Magee, 2003), which implies limited trade increases from South-
South agreements. On the other hand, developing countries may share demand for similar goods and 
may succeed in securing more attractive trade concessions from other developing countries than from 
rich countries (UNCTAD, 2007). Further, trade agreements can extend beyond tariffs to a broader range 
of ‘behind-the-border’ trade policy reforms (Preeg, 1998), which may be disproportionately needed in 
less mature markets.  
A number of studies of isolated regional agreements, which happen to be between Southern countries, 
find evidence of an increase in trade within the region (Cernat, 2003; Lee & Shin, 2006). However, there 
is to our knowledge no systematic global analysis of trade agreements involving developing countries 
and distinguishing by trading partner. We therefore examine this issue empirically and differentiate 
between North-North, North-South and South-South trade agreements.  
In a panel of bilateral trade flows, our empirical strategy draws on that of Baier & Bergstrand (2007). In 
particular, relying on the empirically and theoretically motivated assumption that the determinants of 
trade agreements can be captured by time invariant characteristics of the country pair, we control for 
endogeneity  by  means  of  bilateral  fixed  effects.  Moreover,  we  control  for  multilateral  resistance 
                                                           
1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts 
2 “Trade agreements” in the generic sense include partial scope agreements, FTAs and customs unions (which are 
FTAs but with a common external tariff).  Our data doesn’t include partial scope agreements, but we still make use 
of the generic term. Furthermore, in the empirics and analytics, we also use the term FTA to refer to both FTAs and 
customs unions. 
3  Other issues surrounding the debate include the welfare implications on both member and non -member 
countries (Global Economic Prospects, 2005) and the impact on the multilateral trading system (Bhagwati, 2008; 
Panagariya, 1999).   
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because, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) showed, it is not just bilateral trade costs, but those costs 
relative to the rest of the world – ‘multilateral resistance’ – that are relevant for predicting bilateral 
trade flows. As we will show, failure to take account of multilateral resistance typically leads one to 
overstate the impact of reductions in bilateral trade costs on bilateral trade flows. This is related to Viner 
(1950), who showed that trade agreements may raise trade between signatories but can also reduce 
trade with non-signatories.  
We  take  account  of  multilateral  resistance  in  estimation  by  including  country-time  fixed  effects. 
However, we go further than Baier & Bergstrand (2007) because, as they acknowledge, one also needs 
to  take  account  for  multilateral  resistance  when  interpreting  the  gravity  model  coefficients  for 
comparative static purposes. Our paper is one of few studies that do this.
4  In particular, using a variant 
of the Baier & Bergstrand (2009) Taylor approximation for comparative statistics, we show analytically 
that MR effects are smaller for agreements involving smaller countries. As a result, there is a higher 
dampening effect of MR in North-South than in South-South agreements.  The dampening effect as well 
as the differential gets larger as the number of countries involved in the agreement gets larger. 
To preview our results, gravity model coefficient estimates indicate that all FTAs, including those 
involving developing countries, increase bilateral trade.  Furthermore, the coefficients are larger for 
South-South than North-South agreements and applying our analytically derived comparative statics 
exacerbates this difference. For example, when we take account of lagged effects of FTAs, the impact for 
a 4-country NS FTA is 53% while that for a SS FTA is 107%.  
Although  this  paper  offers  important  substant ive  and  methodological  contributions,  its  scope  is 
deliberately narrow.  While it accounts for third party effects in our bilateral calculation, it doesn’t 
examine which type of agreements are more likely to increase net trade by calculating the extent of 
trade  diversion.  Our  analysis  holds  external  tariffs  constant,  but  recent  literature  examines  what 
happens to tariffs with third parties after the signing of an agreement (Estevadeordal et al, 2008). Nor 
does our paper assess the variety of potential benefits that might extend beyond static efficiency trade 
gains.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revisits the economic theory and literature of 
trade agreements. It summarizes the main arguments and empirical evidence to compare the relative 
impact  of  North-South  and  South-South  trade  agreements.  Section  3  introduces  the  gravity  model, 
multilateral resistance (MR) and its comparative static implications. Section 4 provides information on 
the data and details our estimation approach. Section 5 presents and interprets the results on bilateral 
trade flows while section 6 concludes.   
2.  Trade agreements: Theory and evidence 
Theoretical work, introduced by Wonnacott & Lutz (1989), Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al (1996, 
1996, 1998), provides a number of predictions about which countries are most likely to experience a rise 
in trade after signing an agreement. The standard arguments focus on the ‘natural trading partners’ 
hypothesis, which states that the closer are two countries, the lower are their transport costs and 
                                                           
4 To our knowledge, the only others are Adam & Cobham (2008), Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), Behar & Nelson 
(2009) and Behar, Manners & Nelson (2009). Considering the large number of papers on gravity models, this is a 
remarkably low number.  
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consequently, the higher is their trade volume. Thus, trade creation from a trade agreement between 
two countries is higher the lower is the distance between them. This to some extent explains the fact 
that many trade agreements are regional. 
Recent studies have found other characteristics that are likely to give rise to potential trade-creating 
agreements, broadening the concept of ‘natural trading partners’. Apart from the geographical factors, 
Baier & Bergstrand (2004) find that trade creation between two trading partners is greater the larger 
and more similar in economic size they are – because they can exploit economies of scale – and the 
wider  the  differences  in  their  relative  factor  endowments  –  due  to  Heckscher-Ohlin  comparative 
advantage. A recent study by Egger & Larch (2008) has further tested and supported these findings in a 
larger sample. 
Because  low-income  countries  are  endowed  with  similar  relative  factors  supplies,  are  economically 
smaller and have higher transport costs, they have less scope for realizing the gains from trade based on 
comparative advantage and exploiting scale economies within South-South blocks.  In contrast, because 
North-South agreements integrate economies with different factor proportions and offer developing 
countries  larger  market  access,  they  are  more  likely  to  produce  efficiency  gains.  This  implies  that 
Southern countries are likely to be better served by North-South agreements than agreements among 
themselves  (Ethier,  1998;  Krueger  1999).  However,  if  we  consider  the  fact  that  they  have  more 
homogeneous preferences, more similar economic sizes and are geographically closer to each other, 
developing countries may be more natural partners. 
Additionally, considering that trade agreements have a different effect depending on the initial level of 
trade barriers and other trade-related policy barriers, at least two factors arise in favor of South-South 
agreements. First, South-South trade agreements might have more of an effect than North-South trade 
agreements simply because, in the absence of the agreement, barriers to South-South trade are initially 
higher. Kee et al (2009) show that barriers to imports of Southern countries’ manufactured products are 
much higher in the South than in the North. Second, there is also evidence that agreements lead to 
reforms of other trade-related policies. For example, Lawrence (1996) notes that tariff removal often 
makes countries realign and simplify regulatory and other domestic policies. If it is true that developing 
countries have a greater need for trade-related policy reforms in general, it follows that South-South 
agreements can address a larger number of trade barriers and promote bilateral trade to a greater 
extent.  
Furthermore, while the main rationale of developing countries seeking a North-South trade agreement is 
to secure market access, the restrictive rules of origin (ROOs) in North-South agreements can limit 
market  access  to  a  great  extent.  Estevadeordal  &  Suominen  (2004)  develop  an  index  of  ROOs 
restrictiveness for several preferential trade agreements across regions and give evidence that rules of 
origin in North-South agreements are more restrictive than in South-South agreements. On the other 
side, though, monitoring mechanisms in South-South agreements are often inadequate to reduce tariff 
schedules  and  weak  implementation  often  afflicts  these  agreements,  making  South-South  trade 
agreements more likely to exist only paper without achieving significant trade cost reductions in practice 
(World Bank, 2005). 
In consequence, North-South agreements generally score better on implementation and can lead to 
greater gains than those between developing countries because they can integrate economies with  
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different technological capabilities, different factor endowments, and provide larger market access for 
developing  countries.  However,  more  restrictive  rules  of  origin  for  particular  sectors  (such  as 
agriculture), and a preoccupation with rules not calibrated to development can seriously undermine 
these gains (World Bank, 2005). Empirical papers in this literature often use country-level data and 
capture the impact of trade agreements by introducing a dummy variable in a gravity-model framework. 
Baier & Bergstrand (2007) analyze the bilateral trade flows of 96 potential trading partners and find that, 
on  average,  an  FTA  approximately  doubles  two  members'  bilateral  trade  after  10  years.  Similarly, 
Carrere (2006) identifies robust trade creation impacts for a large sample of countries.  
Studies focusing on specific South-South regional agreements include Mayda & Steinberg (2006), who 
analyze the static effects of COMESA on Uganda's trade and find a small but positive impact on trade 
creation.  Other  papers  present  stronger  results.  Cernat  (2003)  analyzes  seven  South–South  trade 
agreements (AFTA, Andean Community, CARICOM, COMESA, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR, SADC) and finds 
significant effects on trade creation among all them. Lee & Shin (2006) also show robust empirical 
evidence for intra-bloc trade creation for different East Asian agreements.  
Studies on North-South agreements include Cieslik & Hagemejer (2009), who study EU-MENA trade 
deals and find they raise exports from the EU to MENA but not in the opposite direction. Trefler (2004) 
analyzes  perhaps  the  most  prominent  North-South  trade  agreement,  NAFTA,  and  finds  that  the 
agreement had a positive and significant impact on Mexico’s trade. However, other studies (Anson et al, 
2005; Carrere and de Melo, 2004) show that Mexico’s access to the US market was very limited in 
practice because of restrictive ROOs. For a number of countries, Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) 
introduce a synthetic measure of the restrictiveness of ROOs into a gravity model and corroborate this 
result by finding that ROOs can significantly undermine trade between partners.  
We  have  discussed  potential  trade  gains  between  signatory  countries  and  presented  different 
arguments comparing the relative merits of agreements involving developing countries. The aim of the 
present paper is to distinguish trade agreements by trading partner and find out whether there is a 
systematic  difference  in  the  impact  of  North-North,  North-South  and  South-South  agreements  on 
countries’ bilateral trade flows. 
While this study offers important insights, it misses important related issues that we discuss here for 
completeness.  First,  as  argued  by  Viner  (1950),  the  fact  that  bilateral  trade  increases  does  not 
necessarily mean that net trade rises. Trade creation can occur at the expense of trade diversion.
5 That 
is, because non-members face an external tariff, trade agreements can divert trade from non-members 
to member-country suppliers. Thus, the impact of trade agreements on countries’ trade is unclear and 
will depend on whether the trade creation with your partners is greater than the trade diversion with 
the rest of the world. However, a number of empirical studies show evidence that trade creation, not 
trade diversion is the norm (Lee & Shin, 2004; Clausing, 2001; Cernat, 2003).
 6 
                                                           
5 ‘Net Trade’ refers to the ‘change in total trade’ and is calculated as the difference between ‘trade creation’ and 
‘trade diversion’. 
6 Most of this literature empirically approaches trade diversion by including a dummy that is one if both countries 
are members of a particular FTA and anther dummy equal to one if one country is part of the FTA and the other is 




Further, while it has been intimated that the welfare gains from trade are proportional to the increase in 
the volume of trade (Viner, 1950), the validity of this assumption has been criticized by many economists 
(Cooper & Massell 1965; Panagariya 1999). They argue that benefits from trade agreements go well 
beyond the traditional static trade gains, so the Vinerian framework is too narrow to judge overall 
desirability of the arrangements. The rest of this section briefly discusses some of these issues. 
For instance, there exist potential welfare gains arising from “trade-productivity” links. The idea is that 
goods embody technological know-how and thus, when developing countries trade with rich countries, 
there is a transfer of technology that can raise developing countries’ total factor productivity (Grossman 
& Helpman, 1991). Various studies at the country level (Keller, 1998; Coe & Hoffmaister, 1999) find 
evidence that trade between northern and southern countries strongly promotes technology diffusion 
and productivity. As an example, Schiff and Wang (2003) show that trade between NAFTA partners had a 
large and positive impact on Mexico’s total factor productivity (TFP).  
Moreover,  North-South  agreements  are more  ambitious  in  content  and  coverage  than  South-South 
arrangements  and  involve  “deeper”  integration.  They  go  beyond  tariff  restrictions  to  include 
harmonization across a broad range of policies, regulations, laws and institutions (i.e. competition policy, 
investor rights, product standards, public procurement and intellectual property rights). Hence, North-
South  agreements  are  believed  to  offer  more  gains  to  South  members  associated  with  improved 
governance and policy credibility by supporting institutional reform, increased FDI flows and accelerated 
transfer of technology (Schiff & Winters, 2003).  
However, “deeper” integration might not be a welfare-enhancing proposition when trade agreements 
are between countries with uneven bargaining power (Panagariya, 1999). The main reason is that the 
agenda is likely to be set by rich countries and developing countries have to adjust their standards, 
regardless of whether these are appropriate to their conditions. Moreover, they fear that North-South 
agreements can become an instrument for extracting concessions of all kinds not just in trade but in 
other  "non-trade"  matters.  Thus,  the  benefits  in  North-South  agreements  are  circumscribed  by 
developing countries’ weaker bargaining power and the rules will tend to reflect the status quo of high-
income countries (e.g. restrictive rules of origin) (Whalley, 2003).  
In  contrast,  South-South  agreements  are  more  likely  to  ensure  the  same  level  playing  field  for  its 
members. They provide a competition framework between countries at similar stages of development 
that enable them to develop the capacity of competing successfully, starting with the local market and 
then internationally. Thus, they need to be less concerned about being swamped by high-quality or 
cheap imports with which it is difficult to compete.  
In the end, a large part of the success derives from countries’ willingness to liberalize, accompanied by 
intense mutual dialogue and understanding. This is easy to achieve in South-South agreements, where 
country members have similar reasons to engage into trade agreements (UNCTAD, 2007). For example, 
Martin et al (2008) find that trade agreements reduce the probability of war by offering a political forum 
and by increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts that disrupt trade. South-South agreements can 
further  help  developing  countries  strengthen  their  own  development  strategies  building  on  the 
advantages of proximity, economic similarity and convergence of interests.  
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3.  Gravity, multilateral resistance and trade agreements 
A trade agreement between (say) Chile and Peru is expected to raise trade between the two countries, 
but the size of the impact also depends on whether other countries are party to that agreement. Were 
the agreement bilateral only, a reduction in the Chile-Peru trade barrier would reduce the costs of 
trading between Chile and Peru and, importantly, reduce the cost relative to trading with everyone else 
including, say, Uruguay. The reduction in the relative cost of trading would raise Chile-Peru trade. This 
comes at the expense of internal trade within Peru and within Chile, but also at the expense of trade 
with the rest of the world, including Uruguay.  
If Uruguay is also party to the agreement, the cost of trading between Chile and Peru falls as before but 
the cost of trading between Chile and Uruguay also falls. Thus, the cost of trade between Chile and Peru 
has not fallen as much relative to the cost of trade with other countries, so trade between Chile and 
Peru does not rise by as much. Anderson & van Wincoop’s (2003) seminal contribution considered the 
effects of ignoring the existence of third parties (Uruguay in our example, but potentially the rest of the 
world) on the calculated impact of the rise in trade between any two particular countries. 
A panel data analogue of the Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) gravity model takes the form 
       
        
   
 
      
    
 
   
  (1) 
so that, in logs, the gravity equation is  
                                                               (2), 
where m12 is the log of exports from country 2 to country 1 (in period t). y1 and y2 are the logged GDPs of 
countries 1 and 2 and y is world GDP.    is the elasticity of substitution between products drawn from 
the consumers’ utility function. z>0 is the log of the bilateral trade cost factor and the p terms capture 
the log of the price indices in each country. Bilateral trade costs are customarily represented by a 
number of variables, for example distance and whether or not countries share a trade agreement. 
Accordingly,  we  specify                                            ,  where  d  is  the  log  of  the 
bilateral distance between countries 1 and 2,  FSN is a dummy that equals 1 if country 1 is from the 
South  and  country 2  is  from  the  North (or  vice versa)  and  they  have  a  trade  agreement  and  zero 
otherwise. FSS is a dummy for a South-South trade agreement.
7 An “empirical” gravity model could take 
the form 
                                                     (3), 
such that researchers typically interpret the Beta term(s) as the “effect” of signing an FTA (Tinbergen 
1962, Frankel et al, 1995). However, this clearly omits the price terms from equation 1. Anderson & van 
Wincoop (2003) use equation 1 to show that it is not just bilateral trade costs (Z), but those costs relative 
to multilateral trade costs, captured by price indices (P), that are relevant for predicting bilateral trade 
flows.  
Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) refer to the price indices as multilateral resistance because they work 
to aggregate trade costs across the two countries' trading partners.  In particular, they specify a full 
                                                           
7 In the empirics, we will also have a dummy for North-North agreements.  
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system for each MR term as          
    
   
 
   
        and         
    
   
 
   
      .  θ is a country’s share 
of world GDP such that each country’s index of MR is a weighted average of the bilateral resistance it 
encounters  with  all  other  countries.  With  reference  to  equation  (3),  excluding  these  variables  by 
construction generates omitted variables bias because the z terms inside the p terms are correlated with 
the z terms included in the regression. As a result, omitting controls for MR can lead to biased coefficient 
estimates. As noted in Feenstra (2004), appropriate use of dummies can address estimation issues and 
this  has  been  the  approach  of  choice  in  many  contributions  (Eaton  &  Kortum,  2002;  Rose  &  van 
Wincoop, 2001; Redding & Venables, 2000). However, this is  not sufficient to calculate the correct 
comparative statics and empirical researchers have not calculated them on the Anderson & van Wincoop 
system due to its complexity. 
However, Baier & Bergstrand (2009) developed a first order Taylor approximation to the highly non-
linear AvW price terms
8 which effectively allows one to substitute for the price terms by constructing 
weighted averages of all the trade cost variables included in (3). With reference to their equation 21, this 
means we can write (2) as  
                                
                                               (4), 
where           
                                                   , 
          
                                                              
and         
                                                            . 
Baier & Bergstrand’s (2009) emphasis was on estimation of the Beta coefficients, but ours is the relevant 
comparative static, which is given by the derivative. Differentiating (4) with respect to the relevant FTA 
but ignoring MR, the derivative is     for a NS agreement and     for a SS agreement. To account for 
MR,  we  differentiate  through  the  summation  terms.  For  example, 
     
       
                     
        . The partial effect is dampened by MR, which is what makes the term in brackets have a 
value of less than unity. The θ1 term is the change in MR for country 2 (the exporter), which has been 
lowered by importer 1's share in 2’s basket. The θ2 term is importer 1’s MR, which has been lowered by 
exporter 2's share in 1’s basket. Both of these reduce the impact of the FTA. The last term is the (tiny) 
change  in  world  resistance,  which  makes  it  more  attractive  to  trade  internationally  rather  than 
internally. It is clear from these equations that the term in brackets will be far below one if the two 
countries are big. Generally, this effect is not very important because θ is usually small.  
Southern  countries  generally  have  smaller values of  θ.  To  capture  this  conveniently,  we  drop  time 
subscripts and denote the size of all Southern countries by θ
S and that of all Northern countries by θ
N. 
 
     
       
        such that, for any pair of countries 1 and 2: 
     
       
           
     
      
  
       (5a) 
     
       
                           (5b) 
                                                           
8 They do it for a cross section, but see Adam & Cobham (2008) for a panel data analogue and an alternative but 
consistent interpretation of the MR terms.  
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When           , the absolute value of the derivative is bigger in (5b). This is an important implication 
of accounting for MR. 
As we generalize to agreements with a small number (>2) of countries, MR becomes more important for 
the  actual  comparative  static  but  also  for  the  comparison  between  South-South  and  North-South 
agreements.
9 When countries 1 and 2 are part of an agreement involving 4 countries – 2 Northern and 2 
Southern – the analogue to (5a) is  
     
       
                                               ,    (6a) 
where 1 and 2 are a Northern importer and a Southern exporter (or vice versa). When all 4 countries are 
Southern, the analogue to (5b) is 
     
       
                            (6b) 
Thus,  with  estimates  of  Beta  from  a  gravity  model  and  data  on  the  GDP  shares,  we  can  conduct 
appropriate comparative statics. Table 1 gives illustrative values for the values of the terms in brackets, 
which we refer to as the multipliers. Based on 2000 real GDP values, the average share is 1.04%. This is 
dominated by a handful of large countries. For example, the United States and Japan have a combined 
GDP share of 45% with a resulting multiplier that is well below unity. While specific agreements with 
specific multipliers could be analyzed, our application will be to generic groupings.  For this purpose, the 
table also has information on the average size of a Northern country and multipliers involving only 
Northern  countries.  Our  main  comparison  of  interest  is  between  South-South  and  North-South 
agreements, where we see the former multiplier does not stray far from unity but the NS multiplier is 
below 0.9 once four countries are involved.  
  






Average Pair  1.04%  0.979  0.938 
US; Japan  27.8%;  17.6%  0.645  - 
NN  3.40%  0.934  0.81 
SS  0.25%  0.995  0.985 
NS  3.40%; 0.25%  0.964  0.893 
Ratio NN:SS  13.34  0.939  0.822 
Table  1:  Shares  and  multipliers.  Shares  of  world  GDP  based  on  2000  GDP  values  in  dataset. 
Multipliers use formula from equations 5 or 6 with share values as arguments.  
Why is MR more important when bigger countries are involved? MR is a GDP-weighted average of 
bilateral trade costs, so big “third countries” have a large weighting in the other countries’ baskets. 
Changes in trade costs with these big countries therefore have a big impact on multilateral resistance. 
For example, if the third country is Uruguay, which is small, then trade cost changes have a relatively 
                                                           
9 We can generalize for the change in trade between countries a and b when k countries sign an agreement: 
     
                    
               
 
                       
 
            
       
 
         
   
    .     is  the  applicable 
coefficient. The bigger is k, the more important is MR. The extreme case is where k=n ie all countries sign a deal 




small effect on Chile’s multilateral resistance, which falls by only a little, and hence has a relatively small 
mitigating effect on the impact of the FTA on Chile-Peru trade. If the country is the United States, trade 
cost changes have a big downward impact on Chile’s multilateral resistance, which reduces the extent to 
which the absolute reduction in Chile-Peru costs (Z12) is a relative reduction (Z12/P1P2) and hence has a 
relatively big mitigating effect on the impact of the FTA on Chile-Peru trade. 
Multilateral resistance by definition refers to trade costs that are not confined to the bilateral barriers 
between two countries. It is thus concerned with “third country” effects. If Chile and Peru sign an 
agreement but nothing happens with Uruguay, the cost of trading with Uruguay goes up in relative 
terms,  so  trade  with  Uruguay  falls.  By  predicting  reduced  trade  with  third  parties,  accounting  for 
multilateral resistance has many points of contact with the concept of trade diversion. In fact, the 
algebra offers a specific prediction of what would happen to bilateral trade involving all country pairs. By 
differentiating equation 4 with respect to the MR terms but keeping the FTA term constant, it can be 
established that trade with third parties falls.
10  
While it is a specific prediction, it is not necessarily accurate or correct. It is based on a Taylor 
Approximation of third country effects and ignores a number of potentially relevant issues in trade 
diversion. Further, moving beyond bilateral flows and  computing the full extent of trade diversion and 
hence a net effect on a country’s exports would require a calculation for all third countries (e.g. changes 
in Mi2 for all i importers) and would make us stray from this paper’s objective. Leaving this question to 
future research, our concern remains with bilateral trade; MR is only relevant for our efforts to calculate 
the bilateral comparative static effects correctly.  
4.  Data and estimation 
We  use  the  same  data  as  Baier  &  Bergstrand  (2007),
11  which come  from  various sources: nominal 
bilateral trade flows for 96 trading partners and at 5 year intervals from 1960 till 2000 come from the 
International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics; nominal GDPs are from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators (2003); bilateral distances, language and adjacency dummy variables 
were compiled from the CIA Factbook;  and the FTA dummy variable was calculated using appendices in 
Lawrence (1996) and Frankel (1997) as well as various websites detailed in the Data Appendix. It includes 
full FTAs and customs unions but not partial agreements.  10% of them are between Northern countries, 
31% between Northern and Southern countries and 49% between countries from the South. A list of the 
trade agreements analyzed, including a classification of them into North-North, North-South and South-
South FTAs is detailed in the Data Appendix together with a table containing the 96 potential trading 
partners.
12  
Our estimation approach draws on that of Baier & Bergstrand (2007) but  instead of having only one 
dummy for the FTA, we split agreements into those between two Northern countries, between two 
Southern countries and between a Northern country and a Southern country.   The criteria to classify 
                                                           
10 For example, countries 1 and 2 can be Chile and Peru respectively such that the equation is for exports from Peru 
to Chile. Changes in exports from Uruguay to Chile can be found by assigning Uruguay the subscript 3. In general, 
     
       
   . 
11 We thank Scott Baier and Jeff Bergstrand for facilitating our use of the data. 
12The analyses covers the period from 1960 till 2000 and a total of 119 new agreements have been implemented 
since 2000, with about 50% of them being S-S and 40% being N-S agreements.   
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countries by level of income is based on the World Bank Atlas Method, which classifies every world 
economy as low income, middle income and high income depending on their gross national income. We 
have used the official WB thresholds for 1987 and divided the countries in our sample between North 
(with more than $6,000  per capita annually), which include high-income countries and South (less than 
$6,000 per capita annually), which include low- and middle-income countries.    
The trade agreement dummies we create are effectively an interaction between a general FTA dummy 
and a dummy for whether the signatories are Southern, Northern or a combination. These dummies 
capture  all  kinds  of  observable  and  unobservable  country  characteristics.  With  reference  to  the 
theoretical  discussion  in  Section  2,  these  include  those  features  that  make  countries  more  natural 
traders and that influence the nature of the trade agreement struck. While our need to distinguish 
between  types  of  FTAs  is  in  part  motivated  by  the  theoretical  discussion,  this  specification  is  not 
intended to test any claim directly. 
We include time-and-country (it & jt) as well as bilateral (ij) dummies. The time-and-country dummies 
are primarily included to control for multilateral resistance. An alternative would be to construct MR 
terms from observables usually included in gravity models (as in Adam & Cobham, 2008), but dummies 
offer a number of advantages. Construction of MR terms is subject to measurement error, particularly 
the internal distance measure (Baier & Bergstrand, 2009). In most cases, for example distance, the 
variation over time is due only to variation in the GDP share terms, which leads to multicolinearity. 
Furthermore, dummies also capture any other time-varying exporter- and importer-specific effects like 
GDP and unobserved characteristics. For this reason, we use the time-and-country dummies.
13 
Identification of the FTAs as a causal effect must be mindful of unobserved characteristics that affect 
both trade and FTAs, some of which were noted in Section 2. Further, Baier & Bergstrand (2007) provide 
evidence  that FTAs are expected to be  signed by countries  anticipating further additional trade 
facilitation, for example reduced red tape or eased visa processing, because the benefits are greater 
when the other restrictions are  higher. Such unobservables are in the error term and are negatively 
correlated with trade but positively correlated with FTAs. It follows (Wooldridge, 2002) that failing to 
control for this source of endogeneity leads to an underestimate of the FTAs coefficients.
14  
Furthermore, Baier & Bergstrand (2007) appeal to the literature and empirical evidence to argue that 
these characteristics are related to potential trade levels, not any fluctuations in potential trade over 
time. Unobservables affecting potential trade and FTAs are therefore well captured by bilateral fixed 
effects.
15 These fixed effects will also capture any other time-invariant country-pair characteristics (e.g. 
distance, adjacency, common language) that are common in gravity models but not of d irect interest. 
Remaining endogeneity concerns are investigated by running specifications that estimate the effect of 
future FTAs on current trade flows (Wooldridge, 2002).  
                                                           
13 Constructing the terms may be an attractive option if the variable of interest is monadic because such country 
specific variables, for example business environment variables, cannot be identified when using time-and-country 
dummies (Behar, Manners & Nelson, 2009). 
14 It can appear inconsistent to be using this argument to argue this  causes downward bias while at the same time 
ignoring arguments that closer countries trade  more. However, this  second cause  of (upward) bias is always 
controlled for with observable variables, like distance, so standard gravity specifications do not experience upward 
bias from this source. 
15 Random effects methods cannot adequately deal with this source of endogeneity. Furthermore,  Egger (2000) 




A further factor in panel data spanning more than two periods is potential autocorrelation. Wooldridge 
(2002)  suggests  first  differenced  estimators  may  be  preferable  to  the  pair-specific  dummies.  An 
alternative is to employ the estimator developed by Baltagi & Wu (1999). This allows one to account for 
autocorrelation in the error term by specifying a first-order autoregressive process for the error terms, 
which  we  do  here.
16  A potential rationalization of autocorrelation is lags in the implementation of 
agreements after signing and in the trade response to the implementation. For this rea son, like Baier & 
Bergstrand (2007), we run specifications with lagged values of the FTAs. 
Like most datasets spanning a big range of countries, about 20% of our observations are dropped due to 
zero or missing trade flows. If the factors driving the recording of positive trade flows also drive the size 
of those trade flows, there can be bias in the estimates. This can be problematic if the proportion of 
missing observations is large and, in our application, if we think the bias would affect one type of 
agreement more than another. Like Baier & Bergstrand (2007), we do not take explicit account of the 
missing observations and at the same time acknowledge that the use of a reliable method that does so 
would be a welcome addition to this body of research. 
17  
5.  Results 
This section presents regression output (Table 2) together with comparative statics (Table 3). The first 
column of Table 2 replicates the result from Baier & Bergstrand (2007: table 5, column 1), which shows a 
significant  positive  coefficient  on  the  FTA  dummy.  The  remaining  columns  distinguish  between 
agreements signed between Northern countries (NN), between Southern countries (SS) and between 
Northern and Southern countries (NS).  In column 2, all three dummies are significant. In other words, 
regardless  of  whether  the  agreement  is  signed  between  two  developed  countries,  two  developing 
countries or a developed and developing country, it is associated with a rise in bilateral trade. 
The SS coefficient is the highest, implying the signing of such an agreement would raise bilateral trade by 
e
0.528–1=70%.  This  provides  evidence  that  trade  increases  from  FTAs  also  apply  to  those  involving 
Southern countries. This important result will be robust across all of our specifications. The SS coefficient 
is slightly larger than the NN coefficient but much larger than the NS coefficient, which implies trade 
would rise by e
0.32–1=38%. The results are almost identical when we impose the theoretically motivated 
restriction of unity on GDP in column 3, which we do by dividing trade by the product of importer and 
exporter GDP.  
The first 3 rows of Table 3 provide the comparative statics associated with column 2 of Table 2.
18  Row 1 
has no MR adjustment. The next two rows adjust each coefficient using Table 1. As we anticipated, the 
                                                           
16 We prefer the Baltagi & Wu (1999) approach to first differencing because it is computationally more convenient, 
allows  explicit  modelling  of  autocorrelation  and  is  in  principle  less  susceptible  to  downward  bias  from 
measurement error. 
17 A number of approaches, including the estimator developed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) attempt to deal 
with this source of bias. A number of applications of this estimator, particularly with panel data, appear to use the 
method for gauging the robustness of signs to more traditional methods. In many cases, no attempt is made to 
interpret the actual magnitude and the coefficients seem to be very sensitive to the specification. For our particular 
application, we experienced problems with convergence that we speculate are due to the large number of 
dummies included in our specification.  
18 Baier & Bergstrand (2007: footnote 11) only consider the no MR case, refer to this as the “treatment effect” and 
reserve the term “comparative statics” for cases that do account for MR.  
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effect of MR on the estimated comparative static is very minor for SS agreements – the coefficient value 
of 0.528 becomes a value of 0.528*0.985=0.520. For NS agreements, MR has a moderate dampening 
effect.  
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Any FTA  0.458*** 
            NN 
 
0.471***  0.468***  0.355***  0.178***  0.228***  0.316*** 
NS 
 
0.320***  0.307***  0.337**  0.183*  0.186*  0.448*** 
SS 
 
0.528***  0.533***  0.360***  0.371***  0.311***  0.273* 
NN(-1) 
       
0.422***  0.194***  0.242*** 
NS(-1) 
       
0.294**  0.339***  -0.023 
SS(-1) 
       
0.367**  0.355**  0.354* 
NN(-2) 
         
0.350*** 
  NS(-2) 
         
-0.13 
  SS(-2) 
         
-0.0791 
  NN(+1) 
           
-0.0826 
NS(+1) 
           
-0.126 
SS(+1) 
           
0.094 
n  48235  48235  47081  40108  45262  41656  37960 
R
2  0.31  0.31  0.189 
 
0.285  0.263  0.265 
Table 2: Gravity regression results.  Dependent variable is log of real bilateral trade except in column 3, where trade 
is  divided  by  the  product  of  importer  and  exporter  GDP.  Constant,  pair  dummies  and  country-time  dummies 
included but not reported. Standard errors clustered by country pair, except column 4, where Baltagi & Wu (1999) 
standard errors are used. * 5% ** 1% *** 0.1%.  
 
Table 2 column reference:  Scenario:  SS  NS  Difference  Std Error  p  
2 
No MR  0.528  0.320  0.209  0.111  0.061 
2 countries  0.526  0.308  0.217  0.109  0.046 
4 countries  0.520  0.286  0.235  0.105  0.025 
3 
No MR  0.533  0.307  0.226  0.112  0.044 
2 countries  0.531  0.296  0.235  0.11  0.033 
4 countries  0.525  0.274  0.251  0.106  0.018 
4 
No MR  0.36  0.337  0.023  0.146  0.877 
2 countries  0.358  0.325  0.033  0.143  0.817 
4 countries  0.354  0.301  0.053  0.136  0.696 
5 
No MR  0.737  0.477  0.261  0.16  0.103 
2 countries  0.734  0.459  0.274  0.157  0.081 
4 countries  0.726  0.426  0.300  0.152  0.049 
Table 3: Comparative static effects of FTAs. SS refers to South-South agreements and NS refers to North-South 
agreements. Difference is the difference between the estimated effects of the agreements while the std error 
and p values refer to this difference. No MR is taken directly from the applicable coefficient in table 2 and 




Table 3 also presents the difference between the SS and NS effects together with the standard error of 
the difference and the p-value. The very first row indicates that the p-value of the difference between 
NS and SS coefficients is 0.06 in the no MR case, and  the difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level after accounting for MR. In the 4-country case, a SS agreement would raise trade by 68%. This is 
double the effect of a NS agreement, which would raise trade by 33%.  The subsequent 3 rows of Table 3 
are based on column 3 of Table 2; they produce slightly larger and more significant differences between 
the SS and NS agreements.  
The next regression we present is the Baltagi & Wu (1999) estimator designed to account for potential 
autocorrelation in the errors. Column 4 of Table 2 leaves the NS coefficient almost unchanged but 
reduces the other two.
19 While all three coefficients are still positive and significant, they are now similar 
in size.  The applicable comparison in Table 3 confirms that these are not statistically significantly 
different even after accounting for MR. This tempers the claim that NS agreements have bigger effects 
than SS agreements. We report that the LBI t est statistic for autocorrelation in an unbalanced panel is 
close to 2, which suggests that autocorrelation is not a material problem (Baltagi & Wu, ibid), so the 
standard fixed effects estimates in columns 1 and 2 may be more appropriate (Wooldridge, 2002).  
As an alternative, column 5 includes values of the FTAs for the preceding 5-year period. All six lagged FTA 
coefficients are significant, with the lagged terms involving Northern countries being higher than the 
contemporaneous terms. This suggests agreements with Northern countries take longer to realise trade 
gains. The last three rows of Table 3 present the long run comparative static effects calculated by 
summing the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients.   
Ignoring MR, we see that the difference between the SS and NS effects is larger than when we had no 
lags (0.261>0.209 for example). However, this is smaller relative to the overall effect. The standard error 
of the difference is now greater because we are comparing four coefficients and not just  two, so the p-
value is 0.10. Once we adjust for MR, however, the difference is amplified such that the implied increase 
is significantly different at 5% for the 4-country case. Accounting for lags also produces generally higher 
effects than the static specifications, which is consistent with Baier & Bergstrand (2007). For instance, 
the 4-country example implies effects of NS and SS agreements of 53% and 107%.  
As further checks, Table 2 contains two more regressions. We include a second lag in column 6. Whi le 
the NN dummy is significant even at the second lag, the others are not and do not materially affect the 
other coefficients. Further, as a check against reverse causality, column 7 includes a specification with 
future terms for the FTAs, which are not significant.   
We noted that NN agreements are also associated with increases in trade. There is also tentative 
evidence that the Northern countries would see bigger rises in trade if they signed agreements with 
other Northern countries rather than with Southern countries. We report that the differences in effects 
are significant at the 10% level in the no lag specification and at the 5% level in the 2 -lag specification, 
but insignificant in the 1 -lag specification. Furthermore, as indicated by the multiplier s in Table 1, 
accounting for MR would reduce the difference. For example, using the estimates in column 2 and 
allowing for MR in the 4-country case, the difference is only 0.096 and the p-value for the difference is 
                                                           
19 The finding of generally lower coefficients when addressing autocorrelation is consistent with Baier & Bergstrand 
(2007), who do so by first differencing. Applying the Baltagi & Wu (1999) estimator to a specification with only one 




20 Therefore, the finding that NN a greements would engender larger proportional rises in trade 
than NS agreements is not robust.  
The empirical results in this section have shown that trade agreements involving developing countries do 
lead to a rise in trade. We have also seen that SS agree ments have a bigger proportional effect on SS 
trade than NS agreements do on NS trade. While our results are couched in percentage terms, the 
absolute level of trade still rises by more in NS agreements, because our data show that NS trade 
volumes are of the order of ten times the size of SS trade volumes.
21 These volumes reflect the larger 
size of Northern countries (cf Table 1) and perhaps some other features which might make NS countries 
more natural trading partners. However, the higher proportional chan ge for SS agreements indicates 
that these agreements are relatively more effective at increasing trade than NS agreements. This is 
consistent with some arguments in Section 2, including the potential for SS agreements to engender a 
larger number of trade-related reforms and genuine market access. 
6.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  investigated  whether  trade  agreements  raise  trade  for  developing  countries  and 
compared the effects of South-South and North-South free trade agreements. We have allowed for two 
sources of variation.  
The first source is established by including different coefficients in a gravity model depending on which 
countries are party to the FTA (i.e. SS, NS and NN). In all specifications, all forms of agreement are 
positive and significant. Despite concerns that developing countries may not be natural trading partners 
or fail to implement agreements, those FTAs involving Southern countries indicate a large effect on 
bilateral trade. Moreover, in all cases, the coefficient for the SS agreement is greater than for the NS 
agreement and the difference is significant in all but one specification.  Allowing for lags raises the long 
run estimated effect of the FTAs as well as the difference between SS and NS agreements. 
The second source of variation is produced by allowing for multilateral resistance in the calculation of 
comparative statics. This rare exercise is one of the “topics left for other research” by Baier & Bergstrand 
(2007:9). Moreover, it is relevant in our application because, as we showed analytically in the paper, MR 
has  a  bigger  downward  effect  on  comparative  statics  when  countries  are  bigger.  Therefore,  MR 
dampens the comparative static effect of a NS agreement by more than a SS agreement. The net result is 
that the difference between SS and NS agreements is accentuated and statistically significant at 5% in all 
specifications bar one.  
Taking  an  example  of  an  agreement  between  4  countries  and  coefficients  from  our  dynamic 
specification, the effect of a NS FTA is 53% while that for a SS FTA is 107%. These estimates are large but 
in  line  with  those  of  Baier  &  Bergstrand  (2007).  Therefore,  South-South  agreements  have  a  bigger 
proportional effect than North-South agreements. These results are consistent with arguments for why 
South-South agreements may be more effective for raising proportional trade, including genuine access 
and the spur to other ‘behind-the-border’ trade-related reforms, but do not verify any of them directly. 
                                                           
20 More detailed statistics and results are available upon request. 
21 Results are available on request.  
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Our analysis covers the period from 1960 to 2000. However, there have been many new agreements 
(including S-S and N-S) since then. In consequence, analyzing to what extent the effectiveness of FTAs 
has changed over time and whether these effects are as large as we and Baier & Bergstrand (2007) have 
found is a promising line for further research.  
 More importantly, we are still well short of concluding which agreements are preferable for developing 
countries.  Preferential  trade  agreements  can  promote  bilateral  trade  but  can  also  result  in  trade 
diversion from third countries (Viner, 1950). Thus, the overall impact of FTAs on countries’ trade will 
depend  on  whether  trade  creation  is  greater  than  the  trade  diverted  from  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Moreover, this paper has assumed external tariffs are unchanged, but they may be affected by FTAs. In 
particular, there is evidence that arrangements between developing countries have induced a decline in 
external tariffs (Bohara et al, 2005; Estevadeordal et al, 2008) but that agreements between Northern 
countries have not (Karacaovali and Limao 2008).  
Additionally, while a comparison of trade quantities is informative, the nature of trade generated from 
different  agreements  can  bring  important  welfare  implications.  We  reviewed  how  North-South 
agreements  may  offer  advantages  in  the  form  of  technology  transfer  and  other  productivity  gains 
whereas South-South agreements can foster deeper political and economic integration.  
These issues aside, our results show that trade agreements lead to a significant rise in bilateral trade 
even if the signatories include developing countries. Therefore, developing countries should continue to 
pursue these agreements. 
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The following is a list of the 96 countries used in the regressions, depending upon availability of trade flows: 
 
Austria    (North)  Belgium–Luxembourg  (North)  Denmark  (North) 
Finland   (North)  France  (North)  Germany  (North) 
Greece   (South)  Ireland  (North)  Italy  (North) 
Netherlands   (North)  Norway  (North)  Portugal  (South) 
Spain   (North)  Sweden  (North)  Switzerland  (North) 
United Kingdom  (North)  Canada  (North)  Costa Rica  (South) 
Dominican Republic   (South)  El Salvador  (South)  Guatemala  (South) 
Haiti  (South)  Honduras  (South)  Jamaica  (South) 
Mexico   (South)  Nicaragua   (South)  Panama  (South) 
Trinidad and Tobago  (South)  United States  (North)  Argentina  (South) 
Bolivia  (South)  Brazil  (South)  Chile  (South) 
Colombia  (South)  Ecuador  (South)  Guyana  (South) 
Paraguay  (South)  Peru  (South)  Uruguay  (South) 
Venezuela   (South)  Australia  (North)  New Zealand  (North) 
Bulgaria  (South)  Hungary  (South)  Poland  (South) 
Romania   (South)  Egypt  (South)  India  (South) 
Japan   (North)  Philippines  (South)  Thailand  (South) 
Turkey  (South)  Korea  (South)  Algeria  (South) 
Angola  (South)  Ghana  (South)  Kenya  (South) 
Morocco  (South)  Mozambique  (South)  Nigeria  (South) 
Tunisia   (South)  Uganda  (South)  Zambia  (South) 
Zimbabwe   (South)  Hong Kong SAR, China  (North)  Indonesia  (South) 
Iran   (South)  Israel  (North)  Pakistan  (South) 
Singapore   (North)  Sri Lanka  (South)  Syrian Arab Republic  (South) 
China,P.R.: Mainland   (South)  Albania  (South)  Bangladesh  (South) 
Burkina Faso  (South)  Cameroon  (South)  Cyprus  (North) 
Côte d'Ivoire  (South)  Ethiopia  (South)  Gabon  (South) 
Gambia  (South)  The Guinea-Bissau  (South)  Madagascar  (South) 
Malawi  (South)  Malaysia  (South)  Mali  (South) 
Mauritania   (South)  Mauritius  (South)  Nigeria  (South) 
Saudi Arabia   (North)  Senegal  (South)  Sierra Leone  (South) 
Sudan    (South)  Congo, Dem. Rep. of  (South)  Congo, Republic of  (South) 
 
    
20 
 
According to countries’ classification in the previous list, we can distinguish between NN, NS and SS free 
trade agreements: 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Classification into 
NN,NS and SS FTAs  
European Union, or EU (1958) Belgium–Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, 
Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain 
(1986), Austria (1995), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995) 
NN 
The Customs Union of West African States (1959): Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal  SS 
European Free Trade Association, or EFTA (1960): Austria (until 1995), Denmark (until 1973), 
Finland (1986–1995), Norway, Portugal (until 1986), Sweden (until 1995), Switzerland, United 
Kingdom (until 1973) 
NN 
Latin American Free Trade Agreement/Latin American Integration Agreement, or LAFTA/LAIA 
(1961–1979,1993–): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela (became inoperative during 1980–1990, but reinitiated in 1993) 
SS 
African Common Market (1963): Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco  SS 
Central American Common Market (1961–1975, 1993–present): El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica (1965) 
SS 
Economic Customs Union of the Central African States (1966): Cameroon, Congo, Gabon  SS 
Carribean Community, or CARICOM (1968): Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana (1995)  SS 
EU–EFTA Agreement/European Economic Area (1973/1994)  NN 
Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (1983)  NN 
US–Israel (1985)  NN 
US–Canada (1989)  NN 
EFTA–Israel (1993)  NN 
Central Europe Free Trade Agreement, or CEFTA (1993): Hungary, Poland, Romania (1997), 
Bulgaria (1998) 
SS 
EFTA–Bulgaria (1993)  NS 
EFTA–Hungary (1993)  NS 
EFTA–Poland (1993)  NS 
EFTA–Romania (1993)  NS 
EU–Hungary (1994)  NS 
EU–Poland (1994)  NS 
North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA (1994): Canada, Mexico, United States  NS 
Bolivia–Mexico (1995)  SS 
Costa Rica–Mexico (1995)  SS 
EU–Bulgaria (1995)  NS 
EU–Romania (1995)  NS 
Group of Three (1995): Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela  SS  
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Mercado Comun del Sur, or Mercosur (1991): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (formed in 1991 
and a free trade area in 1995) 
SS 
Andean Community (1993): Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Peru (1997)  SS 
Mercosur–Chile (1996)  SS 
Mercosur–Bolivia (1996)  SS 
Canada–Chile (1997)  NS 
Canada–Israel (1997)  NN 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN (1998): Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand (effective on 80% of merchandise trade in 1998) 
NS 
CARICOM–Dominican Republic (1998)  SS 
Hungary–Turkey (1998)  SS 
Hungary–Israel (1998)  NS 
India–Sri Lanka (1998)  SS 
Israel–Turkey (1998)  NS 
Mexico–Nicaragua (1998)  SS 
Romania–Turkey (1998)  SS 
Poland–Israel (1998)  NS 
Mexico–Chile (1999)  SS 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (2000): Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
SS 
EU–Israel Agreement (2000)  NN 
EU–Mexico (2000)  NS 
Poland–Turkey (2000)  SS 
Mexico–Guatemala (2000)  SS 
Mexico–Honduras (2000)  SS 
Mexico–Israel (2000)  NS 
Mexico–El Salvador (2000)  SS 
New Zealand–Singapore (2000)  NN 
Agreements are listed in chronological order of date of entry into force. Years in parentheses denote date of entry, 
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